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1. INTRODUCTION1
The present paper is based on the assumption, expressed in Casanovas (1998a, 1998d, 1999),
Casanovas and Poblet (1997), and Poblet (1999), that the contemporary Spanish legal profession is in a
transitional state towards a more flexible law. This is argued to be reflected in a great number of sociological
changes, which occur at great speed (Casanovas 1998b: 127). At the micro level of situated contexts, this
ongoing change in the overall institution is argued to lead to new patterns of interaction.
Specifically, this work deals with the change that the introduction of the the jury system has caused
in the mis en ouvre of the legal ritual by the Ministry of the Public Prosecutor. Since it is mainly through his
discourse that the professional objective of the prosecutor is achieved, that will be the object of analysis. It is
assumed here (together with eg. Casanovas and Poblet) that the micro-discursive pragmatic devises observed
in the professionals’ speech are not idiolectal features, but rather a part of the internal structure of the legal
system. That is, the discourse features of the legal jargon are treated as the reflections -in discourse- of their
professional culture. The claim is that their discursive structure is licensed by what the actors have in mind
when producing speech, which in its turn is constrained by general and profession-specific commonsense and
cultural patterns. In other words, it is argued that everyday trues and the habits of the institution itself regulate
the implicit and explicit order of the discourse. Thus, everyday professional practice in law sculpts a jargon
with a particular pragmatics, which is different from that of other professions, and crucially, which is
modelled though time along with its professional culture 2/3.
In particular, one linguistic feature will be analysed, namely the interrogative sentence type, which
will be compared in a prosecutor’s discourse in an ordinary and in a jury trial. Interrogatives will however not
be studied as purely linguistic features and analysed through linguistic means. Quite differently, they -and the
text for that matter- will be taken in Brown and Yule’s (1983) general sense as "the verbal register of a
communicative act". Their purely linguistic form will be treated as being closely related to the participants’
argumentation and conceptualisation of the overall communicative situation. Also, communication will be
understood here in a general sense as behaviour. From our perspective, all kind of behaviour -verbal and non-
verbal- is communication. At the same time, any instance of communication has an effect on behaviour
(Watzlawick et al. 1967).
Under this view, the introduction of the tribunal of the jury in Spain involves a change in the
courtroom communicative situation, namely an opening up of the legal ritual and decision-making to a new
participant4. This phenomenon is set responsible for the motivation of an alteration in the communicative
needs of the speakers (i.e. prosecution and defense), not only in argumentation (see Casanovas 1998a: 31), but
also in the language strategies and discourse structure used in court 5. The theoretical hypothesis entertained
here is that the frequency of occurrence of interrogative sentence tokens and the question uses observed
illustrate the ongoing change in spoken legal discourse from a mainly monologic explicit structure to a more
dialogic and implicit one.
2. DATA
The empirical basis for this study is audiovisual data collected by the interdisciplinary "UAB
Sociolegal Studies Group" (GRES), the former "Legal Anthropology and Sociology Group". In particular, the
legal data selected for comparative analysis are two prosecutor final reports in two murder cases, the one
being an ordinary trial (henceforth discourse A) and the other a jury trial (henceforth discourse B). The former
deals with a murder motivated by swindle. In particular, two procurers agree to defraud an insurance company
by the murder of a prostitute to whom they had previously obliged to sign up a life insurance. The prosecutor
had no proofs of their authorship. The argumentation of his writ of accusation is thus sustained solely by
clues. The latter is a crime of passion. A man who had been married to and had a daughter with a prostitute
feels rejected when she leaves him and decides to kill her and commit suicide afterwards. The prosecutor’s
main objective is to dignify the victim and present the accused as a mentally normal -though highly
dangerous- individual, whose declaration was not done under oath.
Apart from the audiovisual data of the trials, this study has benefit from the use of ethnographic
notes, court records, drafts by both prosecutors, an interview to the prosecutor in the ordinary case and an
article on the jury case wrote by the prosecutor himself.
3. METHODOLOGY
An extended field research was carried out in both trials. Participant observation went beyond the
mere assistance at the trials, as we had direct ethnographic access to the prosecutors’ decision-making and
strategy planning. The discourses last 75 minutes and 38 minutes and 15 seconds respectively. After the
transcription, the discourses were divided into units of basic content (similar to the grammatical unit of the
sentence) and so-called discourse spaces (similar to the discourse unit of paragraphs) for their subsequent
pragmatic analysis.
Firstly, the two discourses were analysed from a legal point of view, identifying the discourse nodes,
that is the sentence suggested by the Ministry of the Public Prosecutor and in the jury case, the main legal
assumptions which led the prosecutor to that evaluation. This analysis was carried out taking into
consideration the available ethnographic data from the preparation, actual production and post-evaluation of
the case by the legal tacticians themselves.
Secondly, all the interrogative sentence tokens of the two discourses were identified (using syntactic,
prosodic and discoursive information) and codified for pragmatic behaviour6. Then, the legal claims and
assymptions inferred from the discourse were put in relation with the interrogatives. That was aimed at (i)
establishing relations between the appearance of interrogatives in a monologic legal discourse and the
significance of their argumentative function; and (ii) identifying similarities and differences between the
amount of interrogatives and kind of question uses in the prosecutor’s final report in an ordinary versus a jury
trial. Significant differences between the two kinds of discourses would reveal a different micro situation of
communication, reflecting differences at the more macro level of the overall organisation of the institution of
justice.
4. THE SPOKEN DISCOURSE BEFORE THE JURY
As it has been pointed out by researchers on the sociology of law, the trial is perceived by its
participants as a game or battle where the final objective is to win (Woodbury 1984). Professionals of the law
view it as a competition for the narration of a story with opposed interpretations of the relevant facts
(Woodbury 1984). The battle is especially cruel in jury trials 7. That should come as no surprise if one bears in
mind that contrary to the British medieval jury, which was allowed to investigate on the facts, the modern
Spanish jury has no access to the summary proceedings and cannot visit the scene of the incident. Thus, the
jury’s reconstruction of the facts and their subsequent evaluation will be based mainly on information drawn
from the legal process itself. Each part needs to convince the jury that their version of the facts is the right or
more plausible one, but this cannot be done directly. The jury’s verdict is based on the testimonies of the
defendant, the witnesses and the experts, and crucially, also on the professionals’ final reports.
Thus, the introduction of the jury sets up a communicative situation in which everything that is said,
and what may be inferred from this, is for the benefit of the jury. The prosecutor’s writ of indictment is thus
no longer to be interpreted and evaluated by the judge, who has overall legal knowledge and broad
information on the relevant case, but by the nine members that constitute the jury. Critically, although they
may have similarities with the audience, both in their social characteristics and action (or lack of it) in court,
they are certainly not mere espectators of a dramatic dramatization (Casanovas 1998b: 130). Quite differently,
as Casanovas points out, they establish a communication with the speaker, providing feedback in the form of
looks, signs of attention, surprise, displeasure, etc. It may be indeed somewhat hazardous to say that the
speech to the jury is a dialogue in its ordinary sense. However, it would be equally daring to say that the
professionals’ final report is an instance of prototypical monologue. The jury may not utter a word during the
whole discourse, but in a final report the professional is certainly not speaking to himself. As Harré (1985)
puts it:
[…] even when an audience sits quietly listening to an oration, be it judge and jury, political
constituents, playgoers, and so on, it can hardly be psychologically true that the event is a mere
monologue. Considered from the point of view of public speech alone, it seems to be a
monologue, but we can be fairly sure that the orator’s remarks are being counterpointed by a
private discourse of each of the hearers (Harré 1985: 128, quoted in Ilie 1994: 64).
Legal tacticians use differents communicative strategies when facing the jury, i.e. (i) consider its
members as a global audience; (ii) consider each member separately; and (iii) select those who would
putatively be the subsequent leaders in the deliberation and address the discourse to them (Casanovas 1998b:
130). No matter what tactic the prosecutor uses, one thing is certain: the legal tactician must make sure that
his discourse receives due attention from the jury. Not only that, it must also see to it that it motivates a
private discourse which does not cancel but reinforce the arguments put forward in the final report. How to do
so effectively is the real question.
4.1. Implicit vs. explicit coherence in legal spoken language
The overall common legal knowledge acquired through years of professional practice, constructs a
rich legal commonse which allows -in ordinary trials- for this vast knowledge to appear implicit in the
argumentation (Casanovas 1994, 1998b, Casanovas et al. 1998, Poblet 1998, 1999). The legal principles on
which the legal claims are supported need not be expressed and are actually never expressed. Discourse A
provides a clear illustration of this. No reference whatsoever is made of the prosecutor’s legal assumptions.
On the contrary, this becomes a must in trials before the jury. There, legal professionals do devolte some time
of their final reports to explanations of the different legal roles. As it can be observed in the table B1 in the
annexe, discourse B makes explicit reference to (i) the legal role of the prosecutor (B.0001-0003), (ii) the
function of the jury (B.0004), and the fact that, contrary to the American accused in films, the defendant is not
obliged to tell the truth in Spain (B.0026). In jury trials, the professionals legal knowledge that lies behind
their argumentation is made explicit in their discourse. This notwithstanding, at the purely linguistic level of
how this discourse is put in words, the implicit-explicit relation is, interestingly enough reverse. Whereas
ordinary trials display a highly explicit discourse (with a massive use of overt linguistic markers), the trial
before the jury is produced through much less explicit means in favour of implicit, covert mechanisms that
guide the discourse at the underlying level of cognition.
Clearly, a close look at the oral discourse database from the GRES suggests that the courtroom is
undergoing a change from an explicit to a more and more implicit discourse order8. It will be argued here that
this is due to a change towards a more flexible law, reflected in the micro structure of legal discourse in
situated contexts in a more and more frequent use of orality features. This implies a big gap between the
structures of the contemporary legal written and spoken discourse.
This gap constitutes an important distinguishing feature between the traditional and contemporary
legal discourses. As it has often been observed by researchers, the formal legal jargon used in the courtroom
is mainly based on written language. According to O’Barr (1982: 25), this variety is "the closest spoken
actualisation of written legal language" and in fact "(s)ometimes, written legal language is actually read aloud
in court". One even considers that "legal language is intended to be read" (O’Barr 1982: 19).The professional
jargon of the contemporary Spanish legal system very clearly reflects this. As Poblet (1999) points out,
"although the Spanish Criminal Law [Ley de Enjuiciamento Criminal] establishes an ‘orality principle’ which
has to preside the criminal procedure, this is usually conceived (with the exception of cross-examination acts)
as a ‘reading principle’" 9.
As a result of this written tradition, spoken legal monologues generally display an overt discourse
coherence10. They follow a written discourse pattern, commonly characterised by an extensive use of so-called
discourse markers 11. That is, the global discourse structure is mainly achieved through specific discourse
elements that serve particular pragmatic functions. Indeed, the selected discouse before an ordinary court is
basically organised through verbal traces like por otro lado  [on the other hand] (A.0008); en cuanto a [as for]
(A.0009, A.0011), ya en relación a [now in relation to] (A.0012), otro dato más [another thing is] (A.0024,
A.0026, A.0035-A.0037, A.0046-A.0049, A.0052-A.0054). These provide the text with an internal explicit
and unambiguous coherence. Although the selected prosecutor’s final speech before the members of the jury
also makes use of such discourse devises for its internal organisation (i.e y en cuanto a [and as for] A.0007,
conluiré [I’ll conclude] (B.0038, 2 instances), vuelvo a hacerlo al acabar [I do so again at the end] [B.0039],
insisto [I insist] (B.0039), and concluyo con estas palabras [I hereby conclude] (B.0041) this occurs in a
significantly lower frequency than in the discourse before the ordinary court. As a way of illustration, the
discourse before the ordinary court contains as much as 26 instances of discourse organisers, whereas as we
have just seen, the overt discourse before the jury only contains 5.
This written tradition is further reflected in the few references to the immediate communicative
situation through deictics, that is linguistic pronominals that serve to refer to the participants and contextual
situation of interaction (eg. I, you, here)12. The participants and overall communicative context are not
identified through their changing role in the communicative act, but through their static legal role (eg. this
prosecutor, Your Honor, the present legal act). It should come as no surprise, then, that the speech itself took
the form of a legal, rather than a regular communicative act. Besides, being based on written language, the
ordinary spoken legal language does not take the form of a face-to-face conversation but that of a report of the
accusation’s evaluation of the facts. Furthermore, since the addressees of a written text generally have no
access to the context of language production, legal reports minimise confusion and ambiguity. In other words,
the processing of a traditional legal report is not subject to the constraints of the immediate communicative
event. Again, this factor is much more frequent in ordinary than in jury trials.
As it is, the legal discourse before the jury does by far not make as much use of overt explicit
linguistic means as the discourse before the ordinary court does. This does not imply, however, that this kind
of discourse appears to the hearer as less coherent or less organised. Quite differently, it is argued here that
the discourse before the jury is highly coherent and well-structured. Only, this is so through the introduction
in the discourse of cognitive mechanisms governing the communicative flow, setting up contextual cues for a
directly cognitive interpretation. Since oral production is consumed as soon as it is produced, the coherence
aimed at here is a cognitive -rather than linguistic- one13.
In fact, there have been endless discussions on the need to make the language of the law accessible to
the man in the street, and in fact, it is a reality that the instructions to the jury have been highly simplified in
the American legal system for them to be perfectly understandable by that very important participant. See for
instance the claim for a simplification of the legal language below:
Most language used in law can be simplified so that it needs no official interpreters. Its
meaning could be made clear to almost everyone. There is nothing heretical or anti-literary in
this idea. Law is one device for social control. It should be written in plain, ordinary English so
that the average layman understands it. Nor is this argument that legal language should be
simplified a new one. As early as 1776, Jeremy Bentham demanded that laws be codified in
such clear language that the ordinary man could understand his legal rights  (Hager 1959: 8514,
quoted in O’Barr 1982: 21).
Moreover, implicitness and indirectness is actually recommended to lawyers by experts of
communication (see Casanovas 1998b: 131-132), as effective means to present legal arguments, describe the
facts and cause emotional effects on the jury.
In particular, it is claimed here that the metapragmatics associated with interrogatives allow for a use
of this sentence type as a highly effective implicit communicative device which operates at the backstage level
of cognition. This is claimed to serve as: (i) a discourse-organiser; (ii) an attention-keeper; (iii) an evaluator;
and (iv) a stager of real past or imaginary communicative events.
5. THE METAPRAGMATICS OF INTERROGATIVES
Our folk knowledge tells us that form communicates. That is, that how something is said is as
important to interpretation as what is actually said. A particular choice of form, is thus believed to necessarily
reflect a particular choice in the message. This commonsense communication knowledge has been known by
linguists as the Literal Force Hypothesis . (Levinson 1983). This hypothesis is assumed here. In other words, it
is accepted that grammatical form can be satisfactorily related to a particular function(s). It will be further
assumed (together with Michaelis and Lambrecht 1994) that the form-function link also holds at the sentence
type level15.
Specifically, the interrogative sentence type will be treated here as being conventionally associated
with a metapragmatic or metacommunicative function. It will be argued that they do not signify in themselves
but set up -at the cognitive level- a communication setting of the type: A asks B, who is expected to answer16.
The classical distinction between interrogatives and questions (see Hudson 1975, Huddleston 1994) will be
respected (it is evident that an interrogative such as Can you pass me the salt, please? is not a question but a
request). However, it will be claimed that the interrogative sentence type motivates a mental contact with a
questioner and an answerer role, which may be equivalent to the speaker and listener, or simply serve to
identify two references activated by the discourse itself and existing as such only in that occurrence. All
interrogative sentence types would thus involve a splitting of the locutor17 into a questioner and an answerer,
that is two communicators, playing a metapragmatic rather than a pragmatic or semantic role 18. Therefore, a
discourse which is monologic at the level of the outside communicative situation would thereby become
dialogic, a dynamic and cooperative act. Our view understands interrogatives as being inherently dialogic, no
matter whether they appear in a monologic or dialogic communicative situation. In other words, it is claimed
that through the sole appearance of an interrogative sentence type, a monologic discourse takes the
communicative structure of the basic communicative act, namely the conversation19.
In that sense, interrogatives are regarded as the sign of orality by excellence, as they reflect the basic
structure of the conversation, which is characterised by a constant interchange of the speaker and hearer role.
They are a call to the addressee to provide the answer to the question (even at the cognitive level, we hasten to
say). Thus, they implicitly motivate a strike at the addressee’s memory triggered by the activation of a
questioner-answerer communicative pattern. In our view, this turns interrogative highly effective
communicative means, as they imply cognitive projections of a face-to-face dialogue. This is significant if
one considers that:
The primordial locus for the constitution of intelligibility and coherence through human
discourse is face-to-face interaction  (Goodwin 199520, quoted by Casanovas 1999).
In particular, the claim is that the interpretation of an interrogative sentence type involves a cognitive
shift towards a participatory and dynamic situation, which constitutes an attention-keeper. This is very
especially the case in monologues, the type of discourse dealt with here, where the introduction of an
interrogative sentence type implies a change in the grammatical structure of the discourse (mainly
declarative).
5. 1. Pragmatic functions of interrogatives in legal monologues
The previous section dealt with the metacommunicative characteristic of interrogatives, that is, with
the metapragmatic feature that framed the interpretation of the conceived communicative act itself. However,
it should not be ignored at this stage, that, as rhetoricians and linguists have observed since antiquity, the
interrogative sentence type cannot be mapped with a single use. Rather, it serves different pragmatic functions
depending on the overall context and the speaker’s communicative intention. Interestingly enough, though,
they still seem to share the common metapragmatic feature described above. The Table 1 shows the
percentage of appearance of the different pragmatic uses related to interrogatives which can be observed in
the prosecutor’s discourse with and without the Spanish jury in the discourses selected for analysis.
5.1.1. Expository questions
Some of the interrogatives observed in the two discourses seem to serve an implicit organising
function. A scene is introduced in the discouse, some aspect in that scene is asked about, which naturally
brings it to the foreground, and that aspect is subsequently developped in the discourse. Take for instance the
passage below from the selected discourse before the jury:
(1) no era para él, le había rechazado,le había echado fuera de la casa. Y como no era para él
no iba a ser para nadie.¿ Para nadie cómo? ¿ Por qué medio lo iba a conseguir ? Causándole la
muerte, causándole la muerte.
[She was not for him, she had dismissed him, she had thrown him from home. And since she
was not for him she would be for nobody. For nobody how? By what means would he achieve
that? Causing her death, causing her death.] [B.0016]
In this example, the prosecutor’s narrative is not structured through explicit organising devices
provided by the language (eg. on the one hand, on the other hand, firstly, secondly, etc.). No such expressions
have been used, but still the interpreter gets the impression that the discourse does not contain loose
unconnected linguistic elements.
The question-answer pattern splits the speaker into two communicators (in the sense outline above)
playing a metapragmatic rather than a pragmatic or semantic role. These are conceived as questioner and
answerer. The discourse which is monologic at the level of the outside communicative situation becomes thus
dialogic, a dynamic and cooperative act. It thereby takes the communicative structure of the ordinary
conversation. In this respect then, the discourse organisation occurs implicitly, not through especially ordering
discouse devices, but through metapragmatic cues that guide cognition through a coherent path.
It should be expected from the above description of the overall discourse structure of discourses A
and B in section 2, that this implicit cognitive mechanisms would appear less frequently in the final report
before the ordinary court than before the Tribunal of the Jury. This is indeed the case. As Table 1 above
shows, the frequency of occurrence of this implicit device is 4 to 10.
Furthermore, it is important to note that, as it can be seen in Figure 2 in the annexe, these
occurrences appear in relation to the discourse nodes of the two discourses, that is they are clusterred around
the basic ideas the prosecutor wants to get through and add to them.
5.1.2. Attention gathering questions
In written texts, especially relevant information usually appears highlighted, in bold, cursives or in a
different letter type or size. These graphic devices can naturally not be used in the spoken discourse, whose
channel is an oral rather than a visual one. Attention to a particular aspect of the discourse can be achieved
explicitly through the use of specific linguistic expressions (eg. note that; significantly enough); through
prosody (intonation, stress); or through non-verbal communication, i.e. proxemics (eg. stop walking, standing
up) and kinetics (eg. raising one’s eyebrows, pointing one’s finger at the relevant referent). It is claimed here
that this aim can equally be achieved by means of implicit micro-discursive mechanisms like those activated
by the interrogative sentence type. It is argued that the communicative shifts motivated by the question-
answer pattern, that is a change in the communicative situation (from monologic to dialogic), breaks
monotomy and thus keeps the interlocutor listening. In fact, it has often been observed (see Casanovas 1998a,
Cavero 1998, Pascual and Poblet forthcoming) that the interruption of the judge in a final report can serve as
an attention-attractor as it involves a change of communicative situation in which a new interactant is
involved. In addition, the very question-answer pattern turns the interlocutors into a participant in the
conversation, as the answerer role is projected onto them (even though they may not come to answer in the
end). The discourse responsibility is thus shared. The following fragment from the selected discourse before
the jury is taken as an illustration of the implicit attention-keeper function of interrogatives in monologues:
(2) y contestó, ¿qué contestó? Lo recuerdan, ¿verdad? (...) Naturalmente si se acepta esta tesis
dentro de dos años, dos años por decir algo ¿verdad? Porque él tiene más salud por supuesto
que mi defendida es decir que... Además yo le deseo que se haga de... centenario, no, no hay
problema ¿ eh?
[And he answered, what did he answer? You remember it, don’t you? (..) Naturally if one
accepts this thesis in two years, two years to say something rights  Because he of course is
healthier than my defend one so... And I wish him that he become... centenarian, there’s no,
there’s no problem, right?] (B.0036)
Significantly enough, barely no ATTENTION transcriptors  (in the sense outlined above, see footnote 6)
are observed in the prosecutor’s discourse before the ordinary court, but the few that occur are mostly
interrogatives (5 instances), used both as ordering and as attention keeping devices. On the contrary, the
discourse before the jury makes a big use of this pragmatic function, 42 instances of which are attentions
implicit in the pragmatic structure of interrogatives.
5.1.3. Rhetorical questions21
The rhetorical question is treated here as an argumentative device which involves an implicature.
Such interpretation is taken as the implication of the question’s own anwer, to follow Ilie (1994)22. The
rhetorical question is regarded as an actual question which the speaker poses in such a way that the addressee
will find the answer in the questioner’s mind. It thus requires a mental response, rather than an explicit
answer. In other words, the puzzleness of the ordinary questioner is, in rhetorical questions, the puzzleness of
the addressee in looking for the required answer. The difficulty of finding the required concept is looked upon
as something the addressee, rather than the speaker, faces. Hence, the interpretation of a rhetorical question
implies a metapragmatic shift, the setting up of a particular internal conversational structure in the
monologue, an internal dialogue in the monologic speech. And one of the participants in this implicit
cognitive dialogue (the answerer) is given voice by the actual interlocutor of the rhetorical question (although
it speaks for the actual producer of it). It shakes the addressee’s memory and overall mental capacities in
finding the answer implied by the question itself. Thus, it implies the interlocutor’s projection in the
conversational structure activated.
The argumentative strength of rhetorical questions is thus not due to what they assert, but what they
imply. They invariably carry a conversational implicature to be captured by the addressee. In short, a
rhetorical question is a question at the cognitive level, as it triggers a cognitive mechanism establishing a
question-answer pattern, the inferred answer of which expresses the question’s very point23. Critically, the
access to the point of view expressed through the rhetorical question is then indirect rather than direct. That is,
as many scholars have shown, there is no overt linguistic form coded for rhetorical use. There are no explicit
necessary and sufficient indications as for the rhetorical interpretation of an interrogative. What this implies is
that the interpretation of a rhetorical question as such cannot to be decoded from the words that constitute it 24.
Rather, it needs to be understood as such by the interlocutor, taking into consideration extra-linguistic factors.
Therefore, the argumentative information is not overtly given by the interrogative form.
Bearing in mind the pragmatic features of rhetorical questions outlined above, it should be expected
that no such argumentative device occured in a traditonal prosecutor’s writ. This is indeed the case for the
prosecutor’s discourse in the ordinary trial. No instance of rhetorical questions is observed in the discourse
selected25. In that discourse, the evaluation on a particular bit of the discourse is done explictly through overt
linguistic means (eg. no nos queda ningún género de duda [we have no doubt whatsoever] (A.0001), es
evidente [it’s obvious] (A.0001), realmente estimamos [we really believe] (A.0008), (realmente) entendemos
[we (really) understand] (A.0009, A.00011, A.0014), no podemos entender  [we cannot understand] (A.0009).
The discourse before the jury, however, contains only very few linguistic marker of that sort (eg. "a mi
parecer" [in my view], a mi me parece [I think] B.0037). Instead, the facts are directly presented from the
prosecutor’s viewpoint, and as much as four rhetorical questions occur in that discourse, which serve the
evaluative pragmatic function of the different linguistic forms above.
Again, one may be tempted to think that overt evaluation is more effective than the covert one
operating through cognitive mechanisms like rhetorical questions. This is, however, counter to the opinions of
many legal tacticians. Consider for instance the argument below (my translation):
The facts are described in the final report, one could say that it constitutes an inference of the
facts. The inferences seem inexorable. Naturally, they are not. They are often opinions based on
experience. There can often be drawn different inferences on the same fact. But a competent
lawyer will elaborate an opinion which seems an irrefutable conclusion. Instead, an
incompetent lawyer will say "My opinion, members of the jury is that..." We are not interested
in his opinion (Dershowitz, quoted in Casanovas 1998b: 131).
Clearly, the use of rhetorical questions allows one to express one’s opinion of the facts without
having to say "My opinion, members of the jury is that...". The rhetorical question expresses an argument in
an implicit rather than explicit manner. Its implicitness is not its only positive factor as far as argumentation is
concerned. The rhetorical question seems to display a stronger assertion than the regular declarative
sentence26. In fact, the use of rhetorical questions is even explicitly recommended by some legal tacticians (eg.
Casanovas 1998b: 132), as it helps to create a powerful speech style (in the sense of O’Barr 1982)27.
5.1.4. Ordinary questions
An ordinary question is that which is asked by a questioner to a selected answerer. Implicitly then, it
requires the metapragmatic figures of questioner and answerer. A communicative situation is thereby
activated, which takes the form of a dialogue started by the questioner, who prototypically requests the
addressee’s participation by providing the answer to the question. Apparently then, an ordinary question could
only occur within a communicative setting which permits a dynamic turn-taking. That is, it could be
postulated that only if the hearer is given the chance to answer the question could an ordinary question be
satisfactorily produced. Indeed, no real questions intended to be answered have been observed in any of the
two discourses 28. However, contrary to the commonsense belief outline above, ordinary questions (which do
not expect an answer) do occur even in very ritualised settings -like legal monologues in a court of justice-,
which adscribe a speaker-hearer, rather than an interlocutor-interlocutor conversational structure. In such
cases, though, a real information-seeking question occurs very rarely.
As many scholars have pointed out, (see Woodbury 1984, Harris 1984, Adelsward et al. 1988,
Luchjenbroers 1997, Pascual and Poblet 1998, Pascual and Poblet forthcoming), the question-anwer pattern
imposed by the legal ritual constitutes the principal locus where the jury construct their version of the facts.
One should thus expect the retriving of the interrogation phase to occur frequently in the professionals closing
speech. The data analysed shows that this is in fact the case -both for ordinary and for jury trials. Interestingly
enough, however, there are also instances of ordinary question uses which do not serve the function of
bringing mental contact to an already familiar scenario of a question-answer sequence. We can observe in
these discourses, examples where mental communicative situations are triggered by the discourse itself. The
rigidness of the ritual permits two especial uses of ordinary questions: (i) the question quotation use and (ii)
the open unanswered question use.
5.1.4.1. Question quotation use
This constitutes the enactment of a past real or imaginary question communicative event. The
speaker takes the voice of the questioner in the relevant scene. The question in the monologue serves then as a
context-attractor, as the linguistic construction represents its own referent, it does not describe a
communicative event but acts it out. It implies then a communicative shift from reporting to actually doing. In
the prosecutors’ discourses analysed, this use appears for:
(a) contextualising purposes (eg. cuarenta detenidos examinó la doctora T ayer. Cuarenta
¿Quién da más? [Forty defendants examined Doctor T. yesterday. Forty, who gives more?]
(B.0032), where the question sets up the scene of an aution, a metaphor to challenge the
interlocutors to find another doctor who treats more patients a day, suggesting that such a doctor
cannot exist; "¿jura ust-" la biblia "jura usted decir la verdad, toda la verdad, y nada más que
la verdad?" ["Do you swe-" Bible "do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing
but the truth?"] (B.0026), where the question activates the common image of trials in American
films;
(b) direct activation of the interlocutor’s memory on a specific question event shared by the
speaker, like pressing a rewind bottom and viewing an old scene again  (eg. Le pregunté "¿eso
puede volver a ocurrir dentro de dos años?" [I asked him "can this happen again in two years
time?"] (A.0036), where a part of the interrogation phase is revived.
     The introduction of this kind of question use, no matter for what particular function, involves then a
dynamising change in the discourse flow, as well as a presentation of the information in a directly cognitive
way. It involves no metaoperations, it is directly communicative. In particular, it activates different voices (in
the sense of Bakhtin 1981, see footnote 17). This peculiarity turns the question quotation use as the only one
in which the locutor may not be the speaker, that is, in which the speaker is not necessarily set responsible for
the discourse. Following the brief description of the communicative situation of an ordinary trial and the
language produced there, it should be expected that this pragmatic device rarely occurred. Indeed, we have
found no uses of ordinary questions functioning as attractors of metaphorical contexts and very few
enactments of past interrogations in discourse A 29.
5.1.4.2. Open unanswered question use
     This especial use of questions involves posing a question, whose answer is presented by the questioner as
having been (suspiciously) unaswered. Although this type of questions have been often classified as rhetorical
questions, it is claimed here that they do not imply, but rather suggest an answer. As questions, they are thus
regarded as involving a change in the activated conceived communicative situation in the discourse structure
from reporting to challenging the audience to provide the answer to a difficult question. An example would
be:
 (3) ¿por qué si se hizo una denuncia de desaparición con la descripción tan buena que se hizo
de la desaparecida no se dijo immediatamente a los denunciantes ...?
[why if in the declaration such a good description was given of the disappeared one weren’t the
deponents immediately told...?] (A.0047).
As many as eleven instances of ordinary questions in the unanswered question use have been
observed in the prosecutor’s discourse before the regular court. Significantly enough, these are all open
questions suggesting serious doubts as to the credibility of crucial facts for the evaluation of the crime (see
Figure 2A in the annexe). It is argued here that the occurrence of a dynamic, cooperative and dialogic device
in a somehow rigid monologic discourse must be explained by the particular nature of the case. The
prosecutor had no definite evidence to sustain his legal claims and had to base his discourse on clues. The
prosecutor could thus not assert what he had no evidence to proof, but at the same time he needed to have the
judge think about the improbability of occurrence of the events claimed, by the implicit suggestion that one’s
common sense cannot give credibility to them30.
The prosecutor’s discourse before the jury, however, makes use of all the different functions outlined
above: it makes use of questions for the activation of metaphorical contexts (as the jury will evaluate the facts
basically in terms of common sense and everyday folk knowledge; relevant past questions in the memory of
all those present (eg. interrogatory to the accused); and finally, open questions for the jury to infer the specific
answer expected, whose content is to be interepreted as a possible fact.
6. CONCLUSION
The data analysed seems to talk of an ongoing process of transition from a rigid and highly ritualised
to a more participative, cooperative and flexible professional culture. This is reflected on the legal discourse
in the appearance of orality features both at the formal level, i.e. the great amount of interrogatives in the
prosecutor’s discourse before the jury (62 instances vs. 19 instances in the discourse in the ordinary trial), and
at the communicative level (the functions of PROGRAMME ATTENTION, RHETORICAL QUESTION, ORDINARY
QUESTION 
metaphor/quote/open
 activated through interrogatives).
At the same time, the data shows that the differences in the amount and question uses between the
two discourses is not a difference of kind but of degree. It seems that if the final report is a genre in itself as it
has been suggested in the literature (Walter 1998), then we are not before a change of genre, but certainly
before a change in the genre. Poblet’s (1997) claim that there probably is no such thing as a legal discourse
which can be set in complete opposition to non-legal discourse is taken here to state that probably the
prosecutor’s closing speech can undergo a change adapting itself to the new communicative situation,
precisely because its argumentation and form does not totally differ from that of everyday talk31.
Finally, the data selected is interpreted as showing that the interrogative sentence type can serve a
metapragmatic or metacommunicative as opposed to a merely referential, semantic or pragmatic function. It is
argued that the high correlation of key utterances in the discourses (those referring either to the sentence or to
the different paths leading to it) shown in annexe 2 indicates that interrogatives are used as cognitive
attractors to highlight a few set of points the prosecutor wants to get through.
The claim here is that the introduction of the jury has implied a change of communicative situation in
the institutional setting, which has triggered a change in communicative behaviour. The new institutional
reality has set up an opening up of the legal culture to the ordinary layman. A change in the macro
organisational level of the institution of justice has affected the micro level of everyday professional
interaction. That is, when the organisation incorporates a new participant, this being the man in the street, the
mis en ouvre of the legal ritual undergoes a radical change. In our view, this is materialised in an ongoing
change from a written to a more oral legal culture… and discourse.
Table 1
The pragmatics of interrogatives in the prosecutor’s final report before the ordinary court and before the
Tribunal of the Jury.
Pragmatic
functions
PROGRAMME ATTENTION RHETORICAL
QUESTION
ORDINARY
QUESTION
Total
A 4 4* 0 15 19
B 10 42 5 5 62
* No interrogatives have been found in this discourse which serve either the programming or the attention
function, they are all used for the two communicative functions.
ANNEXE
Figure 1
Courtroom Composition and Cameras Disposition
1. Scheme of a courtroom as it was observed during a trial.
Audiencia Provincial de Barcelona, January, 1993. (Source: E. Ardèvol)
2.Scheme of a courtroom
with jury as it was observed during a trial.
Audiencia Provincial de Barcelona, October, 1996. (Font: E. Ardèvol)
Figure 2
Correlation between main legal claims and assumptions and  interrogatives
Trial A: Closing speech
  Prosecutor’s main
  legal claims
1. Murder 1. cuando volvió J.C.M. por la mañana dijo " Ya está"Y "¿Ya está" qué? Pues que
había acabado con la vida de M.J.A.M.
[when J.C.M. came back on the morning, he said "That’s it" And "That’s it" what?]
PRO/AT (A.0040)
2. ¿Por qué no se hizo? [Why wasn’t that done?] OQU
open quote
 (A.0040)
3. Lo que hay que decir es por qué no lo hizo la defensa si era un medio para des-
para apoyar eh la la versión de su de su patrocinado [what needs to be said is why
didn’t the defence do so, if it was a means to dis- to support eh the version of his
client?]
OQU
open quote
 (A.0040)
4. ¿A son de qué tiene que hacerle personarse la policía en una comisaría? Eso
quizás salga en las películas cuando los fiscales de otros países tienen tienen otras
otras actuaciones.
[why on earth did the police ask her to appear in person at the police office? That
may be so in the movies, when the prosecutors from other countries have have
different different behaviours.] OQU
open
 (A.0043)
5. Entendemos que fueron perfectamente válidas las declaraciones […] Y ¿fue
perfectamente válida por qué? Fue perfectamente válida porque en aquel […]
[We understand that her declarations were perfectly valid […] And it was perfectly
valid why? It was perfectly valid because in that […]] PRO/AT (A.0042)
6. Si […] no lo entiende, pues decimos: " Está usted de acuerdo con lo que acaba de-
de- declarar en comisaría?"
[If […] she doesn’t understand it, well, we say: "Do you agree with what you just
de- de- declared in the police office?"]
OQU
quote
 (A.0044)
7. "Lea usted. ¿Está de acuerdo?
[Please read this. Do you agree?] OQU
quote 
(A.0044)
"No le parece bien lo que ha declarado?
[Don’t you feel good about what you declared?] OQU
quote 
(A.0044)
9. "Quiere modificar algo? Eso es lo que se dice. Después si se corta se ratifica […]
[Do you want to modify something? This is what one says. Then if she feels uneasy
it gets confirmed] OQU
quote
 (A.0044)
10. si realmente M.F. esuviera de acuerdo con sus declaraciones en el sentido de la
primera declaración, es decir de que no le podía imputar ningún hecho delictivo, no
conocía nada de la relación de F.P. y J.C.M. con relación a la muerte de M.J.A., si
realmente esto hubiera sido cierto, ¿por qué, por qué para la última declaración el
la que se retracta del anterior –igual que ayer en el acto del juicio- por qué fue
necesario citarla en varias ocasiones incluso oficiar, como consta en las
actuaciones?
[If M.F. really agreed with her declarations in the sense of her first declaration, that
is that she could not charge any criminal fact, did not know the relation between F.P.
and J.C.M. with respect to M.J.A.’s death, if that would have been true, why, why
for the last declaration in which she withdrew the former –like yesterday in the act
of the trial- why was it necessary to call herin various occasions, and even inform
officially, as it is certified in the behaviour?] OQU
open 
(A. 0046)
11. Esta declaración última era a instancias de la defensa. Tardó más de un mes.
¿Por qué  tardas más de un mes si estás, si con tu declaración puedes poner en
libertad aquellas personas que que que en virtud de tus otras declaraciones las  […]
[This last declaration was requested by the defence. It took over a month. Why do
you take over a month if you are, if with your declaration you can set in freedom
those persons who who who in virtue of your other declaration the […]]  OQU
open 
(A.
0046)
12. ¿por qué si se hizo una denuncia de desaparición con la descripción tan buena
que se hizo de la desaparecida no se dijo inmediatamente a los denunciantes?
[why if a disappearance statement with so good a description of the disappeared one
was made were the accusers not immediately told?  ] OQU
open
 (A.0047)
2. Premeditation No interrogative sentence tokens occur in the presentation of this legal claim.
3. Cruelness No interrogative sentence tokens occur in the presentation of this legal claim.
4. Prostitution No interrogative sentence tokens occur in the presentation of this legal claim.
5. Swindle 1. No era un seguro normal. Y ¿no era un seguro normal por qué?
Por los beneficiarios.
[It was not a normal insurance. And it was not a normal insusrnace why? For the
beneficiaries] PRO/AT (A.0024)
2. Por los beneficiarios ¿cuáles serían los beneficiarios lógicos en este tipo de
seguro? Los beneficiarios lógicos en este tipo de seguro, si son dos personas […]  
[For the beneficiaries what would be the logic beneficiaries in this kind of
insurance?] PRO/AT (A.0024)
3. ¿Para qué voy a estar en caso de mi muerte, voy a fijar como beneficiarios a los
hijos, a los hijos propios, a los hijos de la persona que convive con él? Esto es
absurdo de todo punto y es evidente […]
[Why do I be in the event of my death would I determine the children as
beneficiaries of my death, my own children, the children of the person who lives
together with him?]
OQU
open 
(A.0024)
4. ¿Por qué no contrató o suscribió un seguro igual, un seguro de jubilación igual
que el que acababa de suscribir con con su mujer, S.R.T.?  
[Why didn’t he negotiate for or ratify a similar insurance, a retirement insurance like
the one had just ratified with with his wife, S.R.T.?  OQU
open
 (A.0027)
5. ¿Por qué no se empezó a gestionar el seguro hasta el diecisiete del doce del año
noventa? Pues resulta que falleció en agosto, en el mes de agosto, y transcurrieron
cuatro meses. OQU
open
 (A.0053)
6. ¿por qué dejó transcurrir tanto tiempo?
[why did he take so long to do so?] OQU
open
 (A.0053)
7. Por qué dejó transcurrir cuatro meses? Si además nos vamos a las declaraciones
de J.N. que habían sido muy anteriiores, resulta que nos dice que sí que había de
esperar seis meses a cobrar el peguro para no infundir en sospechas. Coincide
plenamente con lo que tenía ya planeado.
[Why did it take him four months?] OQU
open
 (A.0053)
Trial B: closing speech
Prosecutor’s main Interrogatives (35 instances out of 62 
legal claims interrogatives in the discourse)
1. Known 1. Y como no era para él no iba a ser para nadie. ¿Para nadie cómo?
premeditation [And since she was not for him she would be for nobody. For nobody how?] PRO
(B.0016)
2. ¿Por qué medios lo iba a conseguir?  Causándole la muerte.
[By what means would he achieve that? Causing her death. PRO (B.0016)
3.Probablemente decidió también matarse él mismo. ¿Pero matarse cómo? Matarse
de la misma manera que si hubiera planedado […]
[He probably decided to kill himself first. But kill himself how? ] PRO (B.0019)
4. ¿Saben el crimen perfecto, cuando el agresor o el delincuente no es hallado
nunca porque es tan listo que consigue escapar y no hay juicio?
[Do you know the perfect crime, when the aggressor or the criminal is never found
because he’s so clever that he manages to escape and there is no trial?] AT (B.0019)
5. ¿Y él intentó escaparse cómo? Matándose, como se mata tanta gente.
[And he tried to escape how? Killing himself, like so many people do.] PRO (B.0019)
Y no lo previó en aquel momento, ¿eh?
[And he didn’t plan it on that moment, right? AT (B.0021)
7. me refería a las cartas de suicidio y que por lo menos a mi parecer hasta la letra
distinta tienen de una a otra. O sea, la del regalo es una letra completamente
distinta de la otra. O sea que mm, vamos, puede ser que una sea de D.LL., ee pero
las dos no. […] Qué qué certeza tenemos de quién escribió estas cartas?
[I referred to the letters of suicide, which at least as I feel it, even th
e handwriting is different in the one and the other. So, the one from the present is a
completely different handwriting from the other one. So, mm, well, one could be
D.LL.’s, ee but not the tow of them. […] What certainty do we have of who wrote
these letters?] RHQU (0037)  
2. Cruelness 1. además de matarla, y tan contrariado estaba por el rechazo de ella, que habría
de hacerlo de la manera más brutal posible, más dolorosa para ella […] alguno de
ustedes, si no todos, probablemente todas se habrán pinchado con un alfiler alguna
vez al desenfundar una camisa por ejemplo. Y eso duele, ¿verdad?
 [apart from killing her, and he was so annoyed for her rejection, that he had to do so
in the most brutal manner, the most painful one for her [...] some of you, if not all,
probably all have wounded herself with a pin in a shirt for instance. And that hurts,
doesn’t it?] AT (B.0020)
2. es  posible que ella hubiera fallecido en ese momento. Pero no en medio minuto,
¿verdad? En medio minuto no fue posible […] murió desangrada.
[it’s possible that she had died at that moment. But not in half a moment, did she? In
half a moment that was not possible […] Se died of bleeding.] AT (B.0020)
3. Porque ¿qué ha dicho el médico forense? Murió desangrada. [Because what did
the forensic doctor say? She died of bleeding.]
AT (B.0020)
4.Murió desangrada, murió desangrada. "Shock hipobolémico". ¿Qué quiere decir
eso? Que la sangre ha de caerse, ha de salir del cuerpo.
[She died of bleeding, she died of bleeding. "Hypobolemic shock" What does that
mean? That the blood has to fall out, has to get outside the body.] PRO (B.0020)
5. Hasta que ha abandonado toda la sangre del cuerpo ha de pasar mucho tiempo,
¿verdad?  [It must be a long time until all the blood in the body is out, mustn’t
there?] AT (B.0020)
6. bastantes días antes buscó una pistola y después un cuchillo que está ¡ahí! La
doctora M. necesitó dos manos para levantarlo. Lo ha dicho esta maána, lo
recuerdan, ¿verdad?
[several days before that he looked for a gun and then a knife which is over there!
Doctor M. needed both hand to lift it. She said that this morning, you remember that,
don’t you?]
AT (B.0021)
3. No evidence of 1. se llame "psicosis" eh eh "psicosis depresiva" o, no sé qué, no no ehmd- me da
transitory mental igual Yo no sé nada de eso, ¿eh? […] Se le llame como sea, un loco es un loco.
disorder  [call it "psychosis" eh eh "depressive psychosis" or I don’t know what, no no ehmd-
I don’t care- I don’t know anything about it, ok?] Whatever it may be called, a
madman is a madman.] AT (B.0029)
2. porque los médicos, ¿eh? Los médicos que le vieron en el Hospital del Mar nada
más salir, los médicos que en su día le llevaron en el año ochenta-y-nueve, después
de recuperar la consciencia en la UVI y en el coma, […] los médicos no han visto
nada de eso, nunca, nunca.
[because the doctors, right? The doctors who saw him in the Hospital del Mar when
he was just out, the doctors who then took him in the year eighty nine, after he got
back to consciousness at the ICU and from the coma, […] the doctors have never
seen anything like this, never, never.] AT (B.0031)
3.las enfermedades si son de aquí, ¿qué es? Pues la locura. Enfermedades, un
enfermo. Una persona sana, un médico. Los médicos no han visto nada de eso.
Nunca. Nunca.]
[Diseases, if they are from there, what is it? Madness. Diseases, an ill, a healthy
person, a docor. The doctoras have never seen anything of this. Never. Never.] PRO
(B.0030)
4. a petición de la defensa, a petición de esta, un especialista en psicología clínica
[…] no posee número de colegiado médico, ¿eh? Realizó unas entrevistas con
D.LL.M. [asked by the defence, as its request, a specialist in medical psychiatry […]
he doesn’t have a medical qualification number, hear? Carried out some interviews
to D.LL.M.] AT (B.0031)
5.realizó unas entrevistas con D.LL.M. […] ¿Qué día es hoy? Veint-, treinta. Hoy es
día treinta. Hace treinta días. [Carried out some interviews to D.LL.M. […] What
day’s today? The twent-, the thirtieth. It was fifteen days ago.] OQU (B.0031)
6. Nadie se entrevistó con la familia de mi defendida. Es es la madre de un hijo del
acusado, ¿eh? [Nobody interviewed my defended one’s family. She’s the mather of
a son of the accused, right? AT (B.0031)
7. Está reconocido ese niño, esa niña mejor dicho. Cumplió u año hace poco,
¿recuerdan?
[This boy has been recognised, this girl rather. She recently became one year old,
remember? AT (B.0032)
8. Los forenses, los médicos foren-, médicos, he dicho, ¿recuerdan? Médico, que
sabe de enfermedades. [The forensic, the forensic doct-, doctors, I said, remember?
Doctor, who knows about diseases.] AT (B.0032)
9. ve casos todos los días, pero no sobre el papel, ¿eh?
[She sees cases every day, but not on paper, eh?] AT (B.0032)
10. todos los días, ¿eh? Todos los días del año. Asuntos y asuntos y asuntos.  [every
day, right? Every day of the year. Issues and issues and issues.] AT (B.0032)
11. Cuarenta detenidos examinó la doctora T., cuarenta. ¿Quién da más?
[Forty defendants examined Doctor T. yesterday. Forty, who gives more?] RHQU
MT
(B.0032)
12. hubo un intercambio de información a ver que como reaccionaba y tal, un
control exhaustivo próximo al día tres, ¿eh? No diez meses después.
[There was an exchange of information, to see how he reacted and so, an exhaustive
control near to the third, right? Not ten months after.] AT (B.0033)
13. Los que en mejor disposición están o estuvieron fueron las forenses, que fueron
todos los días después allí a verle donde estaba en cuidados intensivos, y vieron sus
reacciones y hablaron con los médicos que estaban allí. ¿Cuidados intensivos qué
quiere decir? Que no se despegan de esos enfermos en todo el rato. ”Intensivo” ,
todo el rato. PRO (B.0033)
[Those who are in a better position or who were are the forensic, who went every
day from there to see him where he was in the intensive care, and saw his reactions
and talked to the doctors there. Intensive care, what does it mean? That they don’t
get rid of those patients in the whole time. "Intensive", the whole time.]
14. él vio con esos datos que que podría ser que en aquel momento estuviera loco.
Muy bien, pero también fue preguntado por otra cosa. ¿Se acuerdan?
[He saw with those data that that it could be that he was mad at that moment. Very
well, but he was also asked for another thing. Do you remember?] AT (B.0035)
15. ¿Se acuerdan ustedes?
[Do you remember?] AT (B.0035)
16. "Oiga, D.LL. estuvo loco el tres de Enero, ¿verdad?
["Listen, D.LL. was mad on the third of Janurary, was he not?]
AT (B.0035)
17. " Pues podría ser que sí, porque dde la depresión, a él… No sé, como esto de los
nervios que"… Yo no sé qué, de verdad, créanme, ¿eh?
["Well, it could be, because tt the depression, to him… I don’t know, as this nerves
thing that" I don’t know anything, really, believe me, right?] AT (B.0035)
18. No estoy haciendo ningún apoyo. Yo no sé nada de psiquiatría ni falta que me
hace, pa’ eso están los médicos, pa’ explicarnos las cosas, ¿verdad?
[I’m  not  supporting  anything. I don’t know anything about psychiatry and I don’t
need to, that’s what doctors are for, to explain things to us, isn’t it?] AT (B.0035)
19. eh… ni tampoco sé como funciona este cuchillo, ¿eh? Pero ustedes seguramente
más que yo tienen sentido común, es decir que algo de los nervios y la depresión y
todas las contrariedades y la- le llevaron a que ese día estuvo loco, o puede ser que
estuviera loco.
[eh… I I don’t know how a knife works either, ok?  But you are probably more than
myself have commonsense, I mean that something on nerves and the depression and
all those misfortunes and the- took him to be mad on that day, or it could be that he
was mad on that day. ] AT (B.0035)
20. Si ustedes dicen que estaba loco ese día. Y no podrán decir que es que estuviera
loco siempre porque es que nadie lo ha dicho, eh?
[If you say that he was mad that day. And you will not be able to say that he’s
always been mad because nobody has said so, have they?] AT  (0039)
4. Treachery 1. los dos vecinos estuvieron con ellos en el piso. […] Si hubiera estado vacío ese
piso, en pleno pasillo, o lo que hubiese sido peor: si M.M. y su marido no hubieran
tenido abierto ese piso es bien probable, ténganlo en cuenta, ¿eh? Es bien problable
que la cosa hubiera acabado en el piso que ocupaba E.
[The two neighbours were with them in the flat. […] If this flat had been empty, in
the very hall, or what would have been even worse: if M.M. and her husband had not
have their flat open it is very probable, bear it in mind, ok? It’s very probable that it
all had occurred in the flat the E. occupied.] AT (0022)
2. ¿Y quién había en el piso que ocupaba E.? Los críos. A cargo del mayor de nueve
años. Afortunadamente en esta historia desgraciada por lo menos hay un elemento
del que nos podemos felicitar. Y es que vivan esos niños.
[And who was in the flat that E. occupied? The kids. In the charge of the oldest of
nine. Fortunately in this ill-fated story at least there is an element for which we can
congratulate ourself. And it is that these kids are alife.] PRO (0022)
Prosecutor’s main Interrogatives (16 instances out of 62 interrogatives in the discourse)
legal assumptions
1. The jury’s 1. No crean, no crean que si llegan a la conclusión de que el acusado no es
institutional role culpable porque aquel día estava loco, que ustedes esto lo van a pensar, eh?
[Don’t think that, don’t think that if you come to the conclusion that the accused was
not guilty because he was mad on that day, you will have to think about this, ok?] AT
(0039)
2. Ustedes eh? son el tribunal. Ustedes, nadie más. Nadie más.
[You, are the tribunal. You, nobody else. Nobody else.] AT (0039)
2. The prosecutor’s No interrogative sentence tokens occur in the presentation of this legal assumption.
institutional role
3. The defendant is not 1. Las películas americanas, el acusado, eh, el acusado jura. "¿Jura usted-? […]
obliged to tell the truth ¿jura ust-? la biblia ¿jura usted decir verdad, toda la verdad y nada más que la
verdad? Lo han oído ustedes miles de veces. En América si miente, habrá oido
hablar, "delito de perjurio" y se va a la cárcel. En América, aquí no.
[American films, the accused, eh, the accused swears. "Do you swear-?" The bible
"Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?" You’ve
heard it thousands of times. In America, if he lies, you’ll surely have heard, "crime
of perjury" and he goes to prison. In America, not here.] OQU
mt 
(B.0026)
2. Es posible que D.LL.M. realmente no se acuerde de lo que ocurrió ese día. Es
posible ¿eh? […] Ahora bien, […], no se acuerda, no miente , no se q-, es que no se
acuerda. Todo lo que no ocurriera ese día tres de Enero ahí ya no estoy dispuesto a
admitir como defensor que soy de E. que no se acuerda. Miente por tanto D.Ll.M.
[It is possible that D.LL.M. does not really not remember what he did on that day.
It’s possible, right? […] But, […], he doesn’t remember, he’s not lying, I don’t kno-,
he just doesn’t remember. Everything that happened on that third of January there
I’m not going to admit, as E’s defender that he doesn’t remember. So, D.LL.M. is
lying.] AT (B.0027)
4. The victim’s 1. Durante toda la relación, y esto sin ningún género de dudas, D. conocía cual era
profession is not a el trabajo de E. ¿Y cuál era ese trabajo? E. se dedicaba a la prostitución, por decir
crime and must  be algo desde siempre. Era su medio de trabajo, era profesional de eso.
respected Circumstancias bastante desgraciadas ya entonces, […], le llevaron a esa único, a
ese único modo de ganarse la vida. Digna de compasión es mi defendida por llegar
a una situación sin duda no libremente decidida por ella.
[During the whole relationship, and without any doubt whatsoever, D. knew what
was E.’s job. And what was that job? E. worked as a prostitute, since always let’s
say. It was her means, she was a professional in this. Rather miserable circumstances
then, […], led her to that only, to that only way to make a living. My defended one
deserves thus compassion for having got into a situation undoubtably not freely
decided by her.] PRO/AT (B.0019)
2. Preguntas que hicieron los propios miembros del jurado a algunos testigos, les
plantearon ustedes la duda  de qué manera, de qué manera se inició esta persona en
la prostitución. No lo sabemos, pero es bien fácil intuirlo. Como siempre, no hay
otro medio de vida. Salvo que ustedes piensen que se trata de vicio, como algunas
personas opinan. Pero aunque así fuese: ¿Era una mujer libre o no para dedicarse
a eso?.
[Questions that asked the members of the jury proper to some witnesses, you put
forward the doubt, in which way, in which way this person started prostituting
herself. We don’t know, but it’s quite easy to guess. Like always, there’s no other
means. Except if you think that it’s vice, as some people think. But even if it were
like this: Was she a free woman to do this or not? RHQU (B.0010)
5. If the accused is 1. No se engañen ustedes, ¿eh? No se engañen, no se engañen ustedes.
charged for transitory [Don’t go deceiving yourselves, ok? Don’t go deceiving yourselves.] AT (0039)
mental disorder he is 2. Si ustedes dicen que estaba loco ese día. Que no les cuenten otra cosa, ¿eh?
set free [If you say that he was mad that day. Don’t let them tell you something else, right?]
AT (0039)
3. Que yo sé lo que me digo. D. no irá internado a un a un centro psiquiátrico, ¿eh?
[‘Cause I know what I’m talking about. D. will not be put into a psychiatric center,
ok?] AT (0039)
4. La ley no prevé esto. A ustedes les da igual pero ténganlo en cuenta, ¿ eh?
 [The law does not forsee this. You don’t care but have it in mind, will you?] AT
(0039)
5. Si D. sale condenado por lo que nosotros los leguleyos y tal decimos "transtorno
mental transitorio", ¿eh? Es decir que estaba loco solo y exclusivamente ese día, D.
no va a a un internamiento psiquiátrico a seguirle un tratamiento y tal. No, no, no.
D. va a la calle, señores del jurado, a la calle.
[If D. get charged for what we pettifogging lawyers and all call "transitory mental
disorder", right? That is, that he was mad only and exclusively on that day, D. does
not go to to a pshychiatric hospital to receive some treatment and so. No, no, no. D.
goes out to the road, members of the jury, out to the road.] AT  (0039)
6. A lo más, a lo más, tendría una cita con un médico, a lo mejor incluso, fíjense,
dos veces por semana, ¿eh?
[At most, at most, he’d have an appointment with a doctor, maybe even, hear, twice
a week.] AT (0039)
7. Y ahora una entrevista de esas, "¿Cómo te encuentras, D.?"
[And now one of these interviews, "How are you doing, D.?"]
OQU
quote
 (0039)
8. " Pues parece eso" Y nada más, ¿ eh?
["Well, it seems this" And nothing more, ok?] AT (0039)
9. Ténganlo presente, ¿eh?
[Bear this in mind, ok?] AT (0039)
10. Porque apelo a su responsabilidad en ese sentido, ¿eh?
[Because I call on your responsibility in that respect, ok?] AT (0039)
NOTES
1. I am especially thankful to my colleague and friend Joaquin Comín for his work on the application of the data
analysed to the Spanish version of the statistics programme ALCESTE (Max Reinert, University of Toulouse) for an
objective verification of the results presented here. Although the statistical results seem to support our claims they
have not been included for space reasons.
2. "Culture" is understood here in Casanovas’ (1999) sense as "knowledge, behavior and organis ation".
3. See especially Casanovas and Poblet (1997) for an analysis of the new communicative patterns in jury trials, which
coexist with conventional legal formulas. One of the discourses they study is the writ of accusation before the jury
used here.
4. See the diagram on the distribution of the participants in the courtroom in the ordinary and in the jury trial  (source:
Ardèvol 1993, 1996) in Figure 1 of the annexe.
5. See Poblet (1999) for the study of a case in which the dissociation between argumentation and discourse form causes
a paradox of communication. Specifically, a judge wants to leave the last decision about the case to the accused.
When expressing his will to do so, however, the use of legal terminology and a far too complex discourse structure
closes the defendant’s access to the communication channel.
6. The methodological tools for the pragmatic codification have been the so-called pragmatic transcribers (see
Casanovas 1994, 1998a, 1998c, 1998d, Casanovas et al. 1995; 1988; Poblet et al. 1998). They characterise the
communicative flow through the identification of the metacommunicative elements which cognitively frame the
construction of speech. This particular internal framing is constituted by a mobile set of dynamic micro-elements,
which indicate the continuous change of the mental setting through which the different contexts of communication
are set up.Critically, these are not only the projection of technical knowledge of the language, but also of the analyst’s
ethnographic experience acquired in the field.
7. That is made especially clear by the war metaphors that legal tacticians use when referring to the process before the
jury:
"... será entonces cuando la fiscalía haya de enfrentarse a un enemigo mayor en juicios donde se esayarán los
medios más arrolladores de que disponen los más poderosos. Contra este potente adversario, es de esperar que el
Ministerio Fiscal cuente con un arma propia, cual es la experiencia compartida en la llevanza de los casos de
sangre, bagaje que no poseerán los aludidos despachos."
[... it will then be when the office of the public prosecutor will have to face a greater enemy in trials where one will
try the most destructive means of the most poweful. Against this strong adversary , it is to be expected that the
Ministry of the Public Prosecutor will count on its own weapon, in the common experience of blood cases, a
knowledge that the said offices do not have] (Cavero 1998: 11-12).
8. See also Casanovas and Poblet (1997). See also Casanovas et al. (1998) for an analysis of the implicit order of the
discourse, what they call a "language through language".
9. This reliance on and similarity with written language may explain the low number of studies on spoken language in
the courtroom. Naturally, there are exceptions to this general tendency. Danet (1980) contains an extensive
bibliography and review of studies on language in legal processes from a social scientific viewpoint.
10. See for instance O’Barr (1982:17ff.), quoting from David Mellinkoff’s The Language of the Law (1963), on the
extreme precision of legal language. The explicitness of legal language has been long shown by critics:
"When a man gives you an orange, he simply says: "Have an orange."  But when the transaction is entrusted to a
lawyer, he adopts the form: "I hereby give and convey to you, all and singular, my estate and interest, right, title,
claim and advantages of and in said orange, together with its rind, skin, juice, pulp, and pips and all rights and
advantages therein and full power to bite, suck, or otherwise eat the same away with or without the rind, skin, juice,
pulp and pips, anything hereinbefore or hereinafter or in any other means of whatever nature or kind whatsoever to
the contrary in anywise notwhithstanding" (Hager 1959:74-75, in O’Barr 1982: 4).
11. Schiffrin 1987; Redeker 1990; Fraser 1990, 1996; Knott and Sanders 1998; Kroon 1998; Lenk 1998; Risselanda
1998, Romera 1998.
12. Significantly enough, traditional legal language (especially written legal language) also makes extremely limited use
of anaphora (pronouns, demonstratives, etc.) in favour of repetition of full phrases and references (O’Barr 1982: 19).
When deictics are used to refer to the speaker, this is generally done through the royal ’we’. In the two discourse
under comparison, absolutely all deictics used to refer to the speaker are instances of the royal ‘we’ in discourse A.,
whereas in discourse B. they are all regular first person singular ‘I’ or the ordinary plural ‘we’ to refer to the
prosecutor and the other professionals of the law, the prosecutor and the jury, etc. Also, the participants in the
courtroom situation are always referred to as instantiations of legal roles (with one exception), whereas they are
presented either as individuals or as legal participants in discourse B.
13. Memory’s short life is clearly expressed in Givón (1993), who observes that memory can only store from two to five
clauses, which amount to only 8 to 20 seconds of orality.
14. HAGER, J.:"Let’s simplify legal language", Rocky Mountain Law Review 32/1959, p. 74-86.
15. This involves taking the claim of construction grammarians (eg. Fillmore, Goldberg, Zwicky, etc.) one step further.
They suggest that analysed grammatical constructions such as the ditransitive construction are Saussurean signs, that
is form-meaning pairings. Our claim is that sentence types are describable by a similar structure as form-
communicative function parings. Grammatical constructions would thus be associated with semantical information
whereas sentence types would be associated with metapragmatic information.
16. See also Pascual (1997a, b and 1998) and Pascual and Poblet (1998).
17. Bakthin (1981) distinguishes the speaker  (the actual utterer of the utterance) from the locutor (the voices set
responsible for what is said in the discourse). For instance, if the prosecutor says "And then the defendant will surely
go ‘I’m innocent’", the whole utterance is produced by the prosector as the utterer, it is also adscribed to the his own
voice, but the bit "‘I’m innocent’" would be adscribed to the defendant, as the prosecutor views him. Ducrot (1988)
identifies a third element, the enunciator (an abstract point of view inner to the utterance). For instance, the negative
construction is argued to involve an enunciator who states what is negated and another one who negates that
statement.
18. The term communicators is used here in order to distinguish our implicit questioner and answerer from Bakhtin’s
pragmatic locutors (see previous footnote), and Ducrot’s semantic enunciators.
19. Naturally, all sentence types  involve a dialogue when they are mis en ouvre, as speech is dialogic in nature. The
communicative situation is however made more salient in the case of interrogatives -versus declaratives- because
they prototypically induce the addressee to participate. It is interesting to note that the other prototypically
‘conversational sentence types’, namely imperatives (that call for an external -usually physical- response) and
exclamatives (that express the speaker’s feelings on what is introduced in the discourse) share a similar behaviour in
legal speeches before the ordinary court and before the jury. As it should be expected, no instance of imperatives or
exclamatives occurs in the ordinary trial, where that cannot be said of the jury trial (eg. Ténganlo en cuenta [Bear that
in mind] B.0039, ¡Dolor! Treinta-y-una puñaladas una detrás de otra! [Pain! Thirty-one stabs, one after the other!]
B.0020).
20. GOODWIN, C.: "The negotiation of coherence within conversation", in GERNSBACHER, M.A. and GIVÓN, T.
(ed.): Coherence in spontaneous speech. Amsterdam/Ph., John Benjamin, 1995, p. 117-135.
21. The multiplicity of functions related to the rhetorical question have been known since long. See for instance
Aristotele’s definition below:
"The object of this form [for the interrogation] is to enforce an argument; or to take the adversary by surprise and
extract from him an unguarded admission; or to place him in an awkward dilemma… It [the rhetorical question] may
be made inthis way subservient to proof." (quoted Cope 1970: 362, in Ilie 1994: 10).
This notwithstanding, and in spite of the fact that there is no accepted definition of rhetorical questions (see Ilie 1994:
42), from the different definitions available in the literature, the one used here will be due to Ilie (1994), who defines
them as sharing the following features:
(i) the discrepancy betweeen the interrogative form of the rhetorical question and its communicative function as a
statement
(ii) the polarity shift between the rhetorical question and its implied statement
(iii) the implicitness and the exclusiveness of the answer to the rhetorical question
(iv) the addresser’s commitment to the implicit answer
(v) the multifunctionality o f the rhetorical question.
22. This definition is opposed to that of many traditional studies (cf. Laudsberg 1967, Leech 1973, Cuddon 1979,
Longman Dictionary of the English Language 1988), which identify rhetorical questions by their expecting no
answer. As it is argued in Pascual and Poblet (1998), this definition poses serious theoretical problems, as it is
founded on the speaker’s communicative intention. See also Ilie (1994) for an in depth and insightful development
and criticism of this view.
23. The interpretation of the rhetorical question as an assertion is made explicit in the use of the conditional tense in the
utterance below (from the discourse before the jury analysed here):
Pero, ¿Cómo es admisible que alguien diga que ganaba siete mil pesetas diarias limpiando oficinas? ¡¿Dónde está
esta oficina, que la limpiaría yo mismo?!
[But how can it be accepted that someone says that she earned seven thousand pesetas a day cleaning offices? Where
is that office ‘cause I would clean it myself?!] (B.0028).
Clearly, as it is suggested in Pascual (1998: 5), the conditional use is licensed by the mental activation of the
assertion "there is no office for which one can earn seven thousand pesetas a day". See also Ilie (1994: 17ff.) for an
overview of translational approaches to rhetorical question and experiments on note-taking, which support this
analysis.
24. Although no specific formal features linked with rhetorical questions have been observed in the English language, see
Pascual 1998, for the theoretical implications of a broader definition of form (including prosodic, lexical and kinetic
information). See also Ilie (1994: 21-22) for an overview on studies of language which do show particular linguistic
markers to distinguish rhetorical from ordinary questions (i.e. Mandarin Chinese, Otomi, Korku, Vagla, Sunwar,
Waama, and Ese Ejja).
25. It should be noted, however, that a similar pragmatic devise does occur in this discourse, namely the open question
which is left unanswered (commonly confused with the rhetorical question, see Ilie 1994). This other use of questions
is dealt with in the next section.
26. As Ilie (1994: 42) outlines, rhetorical questions have traditionally been described not as being semantically
statements, but "strong assertions" (Quirk et al. 1972. 1985; Pope 1976; Best 1982; Meibauer 1986; Collins English
Grammar 1990; Pope 197), expressing  "intense conviction of a certain view (Leech 1973), "expecting the audience
to be totally convinced about the appropriate reply" (Gray 1984), as they assert something that "cannot be denied"
(Wales 1989).
27. An even more powerful argument, however, is provided by the answer to a rhetorical question, as it is conceived as
the cancellation of what is understood as a strong statement. See for instance the following discourse from a counsel
for the defense, who argues in favour of the victim’s suicide instead of murder.
Nos lo dijo la tía, nos dijo que veía a G. angustiada y a J.M., a los dos por problemas económicos. "¿Quién no sufre
por problemas económicos?"  nos dice la acusación particular. Yo se lo diré: No sufre por problemas económicos
una niña de diecisiete años.
[Her aunt told is, she told us that G. and J.M. looked very anxious, both of them, for financial problems. "Who does
not have financial problems ?" Says to us the Private Prosecutor. I will tell you: A kid of seventeen does not have
financial problems ] (0025-0026).
28. There is however one instance of a question use, which may be interpreted as contradicting this claim:
ahora me falla la memoria, pero desde luego, en la primera quincena de este mes... ¿Qué día es hoy? veint- treinta,
hoy es día treinta. Hace quince días.
[I cannot remember now, but in any case, in the first fortnight of this month... what day’s today? it’s the twent-, it’s
the thirtieth today. It was fifteen days ago] (B. 0031).
This does not constitute a real question asked at the jury for its member to answer. Rather, it seems to help the
speaker in the organisation of his ideas. He is asking himself in order to help himself think. In that sense, then, this is
a case of a pshychopragmatic rather than sociopragmatic use of a question (Marcelo Dascal in personal
communication).
29. Strictly speaking, one case can be observed of a context-creator question in: pues le decimos, está usted de acuerdo
con lo que acaba de de declarar en la comisaría, lea usted, está de acuerdo? No le parece bien lo que ha declarado?
Quiere modificarlo? [so we ask him "do you agree with what you declared in the police station? Don’t you feel good
about what you declared? Do you want to modify it?] (0043). The question serves as an illustration of the kind of
interaction event suggested by the prosecutor.
30. This particular question use occurs in great frequency in the counsel’ final report (see for instance Pascual and Poblet
1998). This is due to the legal role to that part, namely, the opening up of new possible interpretations of the facts for
which one has no definite proof but which favour the defendant.
31. In fact, a change in legal language due to a non-linguistic phenomenon has already been observed by Bourcier (1996,
summarised in Casanovas 1999), namely the change in legal writing as a result of the introdution of technology.
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